

## INTERNAL SECURITY REFORM PROGRAM

### INITIATIVE REPORT

#### PERUVIAN INTELLIGENCE REFORM INITIATIVE April - July, 2002

From April to July, 2002 the Project on Justice in Times of Transition undertook an initiative to assist leaders with responsibility for domestic intelligence activities in Peru with the challenging task of reforming Peru's intelligence services. This program was developed at the request of Juan Velit Granda, President of Peru's National Intelligence Council (CNI), who took part in the Project's *Combating Terrorism Program* in February, 2002. In addition, the Project's experience assisting political leaders and policy-makers in Guatemala with the process of internal security reform made it especially well-positioned to lead this initiative.

Peru is currently at a critical juncture in which it is making an unprecedented transition within its intelligence services. For years, under the leadership of Vladimiro Montesinos, the National Intelligence Service of Peru (SIN) was marked by an excess of corruption, political spying, extortion and other illegal activities. With the departure of President Fujimori and Montesinos in 2001, the SIN was dismantled, and the National Intelligence Council (CNI) was created as Peru's central intelligence coordinating body. With a sharply reduced budget, a lack of files and essential resources, and a mandate that is still being defined, the CNI faces many challenges as it strives to become an agency that is able to effectively and democratically coordinate all intelligence activities in Peru.

Juan Velit Granda, appointed President of the CNI in April, 2002, suggested that the Project's methodology of bringing together decision-makers from around the world to share their experiences and expertise could be particularly useful to strengthening Peru's reform process. He proposed a number of ways in which the Project could be of assistance, including:

- Providing a critical analysis of the Law of the Intelligence Services (enacted on June 12, 2001, at the beginning of the Toledo administration) within a comparative perspective to identify omissions and inadequacies
- Formulating strategic criteria to be considered in the reform process, particularly in regard to democratic controls
- Helping with consensus-building by bringing together civilian and military leaders, congresspeople and journalists to discuss key issues related to intelligence in Peru

Bearing these suggestions in mind, the Project proposed to Velit Granda that it lead an initiative that would assist the Peruvian intelligence reform process by producing a set of recommendations developed by a highly qualified group of international experts. Under the direction of Professor Philip Heymann, Faculty Chair of the Project on Justice in Times of Transition, and with significant input from experts on intelligence and security issues from Argentina, Canada, Guatemala, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, and elsewhere, recommendations were drafted to assist Peru with its transition process.

#### **Program Structure**

The initiative was designed to achieve the goals set out by Juan Velit Granda, which included producing a critical analysis of Peru's Law of the Intelligence Services, outlining strategic criteria for the internal security reform process in Peru, encouraging public discussion and awareness on the issue of intelligence and internal security, and assisting with consensus-building among civilian and military officials, as well as members of civil society. The program took place over

the course of four months, and included three distinct phases, each of which is described in detail below:

Philip Heymann, Faculty Chair, Project on Justice in Times of Transition, Luis Iberico Nunez - Fifth Vicepresident of Congress, Peru; and Juan Velit Granda, President of the National Council of Intelligence, Peru

- The Project contacted individuals from around the world with expertise in the areas of intelligence and security, asking that they provide written feedback on Peru's intelligence law, as well as suggested strategies for reform.
- A small working group, which included nine international experts and three Peruvians, was convened at Harvard University. This group discussed key issues related to intelligence reform in Peru and, taking into account the written feedback previously submitted, drafted a comprehensive set of recommendations for facilitating the reform process in Peru. These recommendations were then translated into Spanish and distributed widely among Peru's intelligence community.
- The recommendations were presented to Juan Velit Granda and a wide range of Peruvians at a public forum at the Peruvian Congress on July 3, 2002. During the forum, as well as in an additional meeting with military and civilian intelligence officers at the CNI, Peruvians had the opportunity to ask questions in response to the recommendations and discuss complex issues related to intelligence in Peru.

#### *A. Solicitation of Written Feedback from Experts Around the World*

In April, 2002 the Project contacted nearly 30 experts on intelligence from around the world to request that they provide a critical analysis of Peru's recently enacted Law of the Intelligence Services, as well as strategies to be considered in the Peruvian reform process, particularly in relation to creating democratic controls. The Project posed specific questions related to various articles within the law, such as whether the law contained sufficient rules limiting the activities of domestic intelligence agencies in Peru, and if Peru's intelligence agencies should be given a mandate to collect and analyze intelligence to promote "development". The experts were also asked to consider a broader set of questions, such as what types of internal controls and oversight mechanisms they considered essential for monitoring the activities of intelligence agencies in a democratic society.

Fifteen international practitioners provided written feedback, sharing their knowledge and perspectives about intelligence reform based on their own experiences of reforming systems of intelligence and security agencies in their countries. The individuals who provided feedback on the Peruvian law were:

- **Sandy Africa** - General Manager of the South African Intelligence Academy, South Africa
- **Bernardo Arévalo de León** - Regional Director for Latin America, War Torn Societies Project International; former Director of FLACSO's Towards a New Security Policy for Democracy Project, Guatemala

- **Raul Benitez Manaut** - Professor of International Relations, National University of Mexico
- **Jorge Chabat** - Professor of International Relations, Center for Economic Research and Teaching, Mexico
- **Vaughn Collins** - Deputy Commissioner of Investigation and Organized Crime, Canada
- **Michael DeFeo** - Assistant Director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation's Office of Professional Responsibility
- **Neil Gallagher** - Senior Vice President at Bank of America with Responsibility for Homeland Security; former Assistant Director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Division
- **Edgar Gutierrez** - Secretary of Strategic Analysis, Guatemala
- **Siyabulela Mlombile** - Deputy National Commissioner, South African Correctional Services; former General Manager of Support Services at the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee, South Africa
- **Michael O'Neil** - former General Counsel of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
- **Morris Panner** - Chief Executive Officer, OpenAir.com; former Deputy Chief of the Narcotics Section of the Criminal Division, Department of Justice, United States
- **Joy Wijnen Riems** - Senior Officer, Netherlands National Security Service
- **William Rooney** - Associate of the Clarridge Group; former Executive and Field Operations Officer of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
- **Andrzej Rzeplinski** - Director, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Poland
- **José Manuel Ugarte** - Advisor to the Senate National Defense Commission, Argentina

*B. Meeting of Working Group at Harvard University to Draft Recommendations for Peru May 29-31, 2002)*

A smaller group, including nine of the afore-mentioned international experts and three Peruvians, met at Harvard Law School from May 29 to 31, 2002 to discuss key issues that should be incorporated into a comprehensive set of recommendations for Peru. During the three-day meeting, the group focused on a number of critical areas, including: jurisdictions of intelligence agencies, permitted and prohibited activities, accountability systems, and developing centralized controls over intelligence policy-making and implementation. A set of recommendations was drafted after the second day which incorporated the highlights of the group's discussions and mutually agreed-upon suggestions for reforming Peru's intelligence apparatus. The group then spent the final day proposing additions and modifications to these recommendations.

The following international experts took part in this meeting:

- **Ciro Alegría Varona** - Professor at the Pontificia Catholic University of Peru; Advisor to the president of Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission and to the Constitutional Commission of the Peruvian Congress; former Advisor to the Peruvian Minister of Defense
- **Bernardo Arévalo de León** - Regional Director for Latin America, War Torn Societies Project International; former Director of FLACSO's Towards a New Security Policy for Democracy Project, Guatemala
- **Vaughn Collins** - Deputy Commissioner of Investigation and Organized Crime, Canada
- **Neil Gallagher** - Senior Vice President at Bank of America with Responsibility for Homeland Security; former Assistant Director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Division
- **Philip Heymann** - James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard University; former U.S. Deputy Attorney General; Faculty Chair of the Project on Justice in Times of Transition
- **Luis Iberico Nunez** - Fifth Vicepresident of Congress, Peru
- **Luis Moreno Ocampo** - President of Transparent Markets, *Poder Ciudadano* and Transparency International for Latin America; former prosecutor, Argentina
- **Siyabulela Mlombile** - Deputy National Commissioner, South African Correctional Services; former General Manager of Support Services at the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee, South Africa

- **Michael O'Neil** - former General Counsel of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
- **Morris Panner** - Chief Executive Officer, OpenAir.com; former Deputy Chief of the Narcotics Section of the Criminal Division, Department of Justice, United States
- **Oscar Schiappa-Pietra** - Mason Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University; former Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister, Peru
- **Joy Wijnen Riems** - Senior Officer, Netherlands National Security Service
- **José Manuel Ugarte** - Advisor to the Senate National Defense Commission, Argentina

On the first morning, *Luis Iberico Nunez*, Fifth Vicepresident of the Peruvian Congress, *Ciro Alegría Varona*, Professor at the Pontificia Catholic University of Peru, and *Oscar Schiappa-Pietra*, former Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister of Peru, gave a briefing on Peruvian intelligence to the working group. They focused on the historical context, current political climate in Peru, public attitudes and expectations in relation to intelligence, and central challenges for the reform process, among other topics.

These presentations and the discussion that followed provided the working group with ample opportunity at the onset of the meeting to ask specific questions and learn more about the dynamics of the intelligence reform process in Peru. The participation of these Peruvians at the working group meeting was essential for ensuring that the discussion remained relevant to the situation in Peru and the recommendations were framed appropriately.

During the first two days of the meeting, the agenda was divided into distinct sessions, each of which began with two or three 10-15 minute presentations that were followed by a period of open discussion. The first session on the jurisdiction of intelligence agencies allowed the group to discuss such questions as whether a single agency should be assigned responsibilities for both domestic and foreign intelligence in Peru and if the permissible subjects should be made public.

The group also assessed the current threats to national security in Peru, as well as which of these threats should be addressed by intelligence agencies. This was followed by a session on the permitted and prohibited activities of intelligence agencies, which included discussion of the rules that are necessary regarding privacy, maintaining files on individuals, and public access to information. During the subsequent session on accountability systems the group focused on the rules and oversight that they deemed most appropriate for Peru's intelligence system.

During the second day, the group talked at length about developing centralized controls over intelligence policy-making and implementation, and in particular the role of Peru's National Intelligence Council (CNI) within the National Intelligence System in Peru. After presentations about the intelligence models used in South Africa and the United States that encouraged the centralization and coordination of information, the group focused on the situation in Peru and discussed what the critical responsibilities of the CNI should be and what powers were needed by the CNI to carry out such responsibilities. The group also assessed the types of opposition to central controls over intelligence and what could be done to encourage collaboration between the various military and civilian intelligence agencies in Peru.

After two days of intense discussion, Philip Heymann drafted an initial set of recommendations, based on the group's feedback, as well as the written comments that had been submitted in advance of the meeting. Individuals in the working group then pointed out aspects of the recommendations that they felt should be omitted or modified, however all of the participants agreed that the recommendations adequately reflected their viewpoints and included the key conclusions that had been reached by the group. At the end of the meeting, the group assessed which individuals should take part in the next phase of the program and travel to Peru for the public forum event.

After this meeting, the revised recommendations were distributed to the members of the working group. A number of experts proposed further modifications and additions to the recommendations, and these changes were then incorporated into the final document. After being translated into Spanish, the recommendations were sent to Juan Velit Granda in Peru, and distributed widely among political leaders and policy-makers, officials of civilian and military

intelligence agencies, journalists, and members of civil society. A summary of these recommendations can be found on pp .6-9 of this report.

*C. Presentation of Recommendations in Peru: Public Forum at the Peruvian Congress and Event at the National Intelligence Council (CNI)*

The recommendations were formally presented by members of the working group to Juan Velit Granda and other members of the Peruvian intelligence community on July 3 and 4, 2002. *Philip Heymann* led the delegation that traveled to Peru, which included *Siyabulela Mlombile* of South Africa, *Morris Panner* of the United States, *Joy Wijnen Riems* of the Netherlands, and *José Manuel Ugarte* of Argentina. These individuals were selected to travel to Peru to represent the working group that met at Harvard in May, and the wide breadth of experience and international scope of the group contributed to the success of the final phase of the initiative.

A public forum at the Congress of the Republic of Peru was sponsored by Congressman Luis Iberico Nunez for four hours on Wednesday, June 3. Over 150 individuals attended this session, including various members of Congress (who included members of the Defense, Internal Order, and Intelligence Commission); officials of the National Intelligence School and various intelligence agencies (army, navy, police, and the National Intelligence Council); faculty of several universities in Peru; journalists from various television and radio stations and newspapers; and leaders of NGOs working on intelligence and security issues, such as the Andean Commission of Jurists, the Institute of Press and Society, and the Institute of Legal Defense. Members of the international community, including officers of the United States Embassy, also took part in the event.

Morris Panner - Chief Executive Officer, OpenAir.com; former Deputy Chief of the Narcotics Section of the Criminal Division, Department of Justice, United States; and Siyabulela Mlombile - Deputy National Commissioner, South African Correctional Services; former General Manager of Support Services at the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee, South Africa

During the forum event, the members of the international delegation presented the key points of the group's recommendations. The session began with inaugural words by *Juan Velit Granda*, President of the National Intelligence Council; *Luis Iberico Nunez*, Fifth Vicepresident of Congress; *Fernando Olivera*, Minister of Justice; and *Ciro Alegría Varona*, Professor at the Pontificia Catholic University of Peru. *Philip Heymann*, Faculty Chair of the Project and former U.S. Deputy Attorney General spoke about the nature of the initiative and scope of the group's recommendations.

Then each of the five experts gave a 10-15 minute presentation on a component of the working group's recommendations, including: fundamental principles for reform, jurisdiction of intelligence agencies, permitted and prohibited activities, coordination of intelligence activities, and professionalization of intelligence agencies in Peru.

The presentations were followed by a period of questions and answers, allowing the participants of the forum to pose questions or voice disagreement with any aspects of the recommendations. One of the issues raised by a forum participant was the difficult relationship

between intelligence agencies and the press. *Philip Heymann* noted that the press can be a good form of oversight over intelligence activities, and *Joy Wijnen Riems* added that it is important for intelligence agencies to share information with the public whenever possible, in order to maintain public confidence.

Another individual asked the panel of international experts what qualities they considered essential for intelligence officers, and what types of people should be recruited for such positions. *Siyabulela Mlombile* said that intelligence should be de-mystified, and individuals with various professional backgrounds should be encouraged to work for intelligence agencies.

After the public forum, interviews were conducted by various television and radio stations, as well as by Peru's weekly political magazine *Carretas*. This provided another opportunity for the delegation to answer questions about the recommendations and ensure greater public exposure to the event and to intelligence and security issues in Peru more broadly. To conclude the event, a luncheon was held at a nearby restaurant with members of the international working group, key congresspeople, and other prominent members of the Peruvian intelligence community.

An additional event was held at the National Intelligence Council (CNI) on Thursday, July 4, and this allowed 60 intelligence officials from the CNI and military intelligence agencies, most of whom had taken part in the public forum, to meet with members of the international group and discuss key aspects of the recommendations in greater detail. First, brief presentations were made by the experts. Then the participants were broken up into six groups to discuss key subject areas focused on in the recommendations.

These groups were moderated by members of the international delegation and Peruvian leaders. Breaking into small groups is not customary in Peru, particularly among the military, and the Peruvians were at first resistant to the break-out groups. However, very interesting and dynamic discussions resulted within the groups, and most agreed that the exercise was extremely worthwhile.

In these discussions some participants commented on aspects of the recommendations that they supported, and others addressed issues with which they did not agree. For example, one group debated intensely about the role that the Peruvian military should play in domestic intelligence-gathering. One member of this group was a high-ranking military intelligence official, who strongly disagreed with the assertion in the recommendations that the military should not gather intelligence on Peruvian citizens. He argued that collecting information about subversive individuals or groups was essential for protecting national security. *Siyabulela Mlombile* expressed the view that the situation in Peru was very similar to where South Africa had been 15 years before, and that for the sake of democracy it was necessary to find political, rather than military, solutions to the problems of the country.

Joy Wijnen Riems - Senior Officer, Netherlands National Security Service with intelligence officers at the National Intelligence Council in Peru (CNI)

After an hour of discussion, a representative of each small group reported back to the larger audience about the key points that had been raised. One group stressed that the President of the CNI should be given the rank of minister and steps should be taken to ensure that he is provided sufficient information from other intelligence agencies, as outlined in the recommendations.

The issue of using intelligence-gathering activities to promote social and economic development within Peru was also addressed. While the international group recommended that intelligence should not be used to promote development within Peru, as this is a very broad area and can easily result in the unlawful gathering of intelligence on citizens, one of the groups asserted that this was necessary for enabling Peru to develop economically.

The meeting concluded before lunch, and many people commented on how useful the session had been in raising important issues related to Peru's intelligence reform process and enabling in-depth discussion among civilian and military intelligence officials about a set of critical and complex issues.

## **Conclusion**

The Peruvian Intelligence Reform Initiative led by the Project on Justice in Times of Transition was a success on a number of fronts. The recommendations provided Juan Velit Granda, President of the CNI, and other key Peruvian leaders with a critical analysis of Peru's Law of the Intelligence Services, as well as strategic criteria to be considered in the reform process based on a diverse array of international perspectives.

The recommendations were not intended to be blindly adopted and incorporated into Peruvian law, but rather to encourage discussion and debate, give momentum to the reform process, and provide new perspectives and lessons learned from other countries that had undergone similar transitions within their internal security agencies.

There was good attendance at the meetings in Peru, and an extremely diverse group of Peruvians took part in the events. This included numerous high-ranking decision makers and representatives of many sectors of Peruvian society. Through the presentations and discussions during the events, as well as additional press coverage, the initiative encouraged public debate and discussion about intelligence in Peru. The events also brought together civilian and military leaders, congresspeople, journalists, and civil society activists, thereby facilitating the process of consensus-building.

It is now up to Juan Velit Granda and his colleagues to decide which, if any, of the recommendations should be incorporated into Peru's intelligence law. Unfortunately, there are currently a number of factors which could serve to slow Peru's internal security reform process. A rather unstable political climate, marked by low approval ratings of President Toledo, possible changes in the cabinet of ministers, and a preoccupation by political leaders and policy-makers with pressing crises (such as a recent privatization crisis), could make it difficult for immediate changes to be made to Peru's intelligence system. Possibilities for Follow-up for this initiative are currently being assessed, and the Project will maintain contact with Juan Velit Granda and others in Peru to determine how it may continue to assist the internal security reform process.

Participants at the Peruvian Reform Initiative.

## **Summary of Recommendations**

### *A. Fundamental Principles*

- It is important that there be public discussion leading to a parliamentary law that actually controls intelligence functions.
- The discussion and the law should lead to democratic determinations of what should be the subject matter of intelligence gathering and what agencies are assigned which subject matter.
- There should be strict regulation of intelligence activities.

### *B. Jurisdiction of Intelligence Agencies*

#### Limitation of responsibilities

- The subjects of intelligence gathering should be limited to matters of security concern and, moreover, to specific categories of security concern. These categories should be authorized only by democratically chosen executive and legislative officials.
- The law should not authorize secret domestic intelligence gathering or handling of information in aid of economic development.
- The law should not authorize intelligence gathering to monitor organizations using demonstrations or non-violent obstruction as instruments of political or economic struggle, or to keep track of efforts of political groups to organize ethnic populations or economic-based groups.

#### Allocation of responsibilities to each intelligence agency

- The law should confer upon each intelligence agency a clearly defined mandate.
- The most important allocation is of the authority to engage in regular intelligence activity in particular areas or with regard to certain subjects.
- The military should be assigned no on-going responsibility with regards to internal security. To assist this goal, the law should draw a sharp distinction between intelligence powers outside Peru and more carefully restrained internal security powers.

### *C. Permitted and Prohibited Activities of Intelligence Agencies*

- The law should define what forms of action can and cannot be engaged in by an intelligence agency, with clear legal consequences for behaving in a way which is forbidden. Moreover, the law should address which activities are prohibited absolutely or forbidden unless there is special authorization and accountability.
- There should be absolute prohibition of any efforts to prevent, discourage, disrupt, or mislead legitimate political or organizational activity.
- Intrusion on private spaces or communications for intelligence purposes should be authorized only in statutorily defined ways, which may include review by a specially constituted court or by some other body independent of the executive.
- Opening an intelligence investigation into an organization should require a demonstrable relation to an authorized purpose of the intelligence organization. Where an investigation involves more than access to public events and records, the intelligence agency should be required to have, and to demonstrate, a reasonable indication that the organization is presently planning to engage in illegal conduct threatening to the national security and within the allocated responsibility of that agency.
- An intelligence agency should be authorized to secretly maintain files on named individuals only when the information bears a demonstrable relation to an authorized intelligence purpose of that agency. There should be published prohibitions of distribution of information in the file to others for any purposes other than investigating dangers to national security or law enforcement. The information in the file should be made available on request to the subject of the file except to the extent that secrecy is required to protect sources and methods of gathering the information or to prevent disclosure that an investigation is taking place.

#### *D. Coordination of Peru's Intelligence Activities*

##### Responsibilities of the National Intelligence Council (CNI)

- The President of CNI should:
  1. Work closely with the National Security Council to discuss national threats and dangers that Peru's intelligence system should address.
  2. Develop with the heads of the National Intelligence Council specific proposals for areas of intelligence gathering that are responsive to such threats.
  3. Recommend to the President and the National Security Council national priorities for all intelligence-gathering and allocations of assignments among various agencies.
    - It should be the role of the CNI to assure that all agencies comply with these priorities and carry out their specific roles, but only these roles, within the Peruvian intelligence system.
    - The CNI should address the overall policies that affect intelligence agencies, including recruitment, training, salaries, ethical codes, and professionalism.
    - The CNI should provide coordination and direction, and encourage appropriate intelligence-sharing among agencies.
    - The CNI should be given authority to assess, evaluate, and comment on basic intelligence conclusions that are furnished to the President or the National Security Council by other intelligence agencies in Peru.
    - It should be the task of the CNI to facilitate appropriate legislative oversight of all intelligence activity.

##### Powers of the CNI

- The CNI should have all of the powers and resources needed to accomplish the tasks outlined above.
- 10. It should have complete access to all intelligence information on a routine and requested basis.
- 11. Its President should be given the rank of Minister.

12. It should have adequate staff and equipment to process, compare, and analyze intelligence information.

#### *E. Oversight and Control of Peru's Intelligence Agencies*

- There should be oversight bodies that monitor intelligence agencies for effectiveness as well as for compliance with restrictions designed to protect democratic liberties.
- The members of an oversight body could be:
  1. members of parties opposing the administration in elections and who are not associated with those to whom the agency reports
  2. legislators or political opponents
  3. people of great national reputation for integrity or whose official positions somehow guarantee that integrity
- It is essential that adequately trained staff be made available to the oversight body.
- The oversight body must also have the power and the will to deter violations of law or failures of performance. This may be achieved by granting it access to budget authority or authority to remove agency leaders from their positions. Threats of sanctions may be addressed to a minister to whom the intelligence agency reports.
- Internal oversight and redundancy generally should be considered as a useful supplement to an outside oversight agency. Internal oversight can take any number of forms:
  1. The minister to whom the intelligence agency reports can be provided with a staff capacity adequate to monitor the agency and which has access to all information about that agency's intelligence activities. In Peru's case, this would require empowering the civilian ministry of defense to monitor and direct the activities of military intelligence.
  2. An Inspector General could be charged with gathering particular information about intelligence activity and reporting to the administration and to the legislature on their effectiveness and lawfulness.
  3. An Ombudsman could be appointed either with a very general charge or with a more specific charge of reviewing allegations of intelligence abuse.
- Steps should be taken to cultivate a continuing and powerful public demand for lawfulness and professionalism in intelligence agencies.

#### *F. Professionalization of Intelligence Agencies in Peru*

- The law should encourage professionalism using career development to accomplish that goal.
  1. Professionalism requires careful recruitment, training, assignment career planning, and inspiring agency leadership.
  2. The creation of a single intelligence school that could provide a basic curriculum for recruits from all agencies would serve the twin goals of conveying ideals of professionalism and developing inter-agency cooperation.
  3. Promotions and assignments should reflect an intelligence officer's willingness to operate both within democratically chosen fields of national security concern and in democratically acceptable ways.

4. New managers who reflect the new professionalism should be selected and these must be held accountable for imposing discipline, including firing or transfers, as a response to misbehavior - especially if the misbehavior is of the type that was typical in the past.

*G. Strengthening the Relationship Between Legislation and Reform*

- The legislation should include a directive to the executive to establish a National Intelligence Review Commission.
  1. The Commission should be charged with establishing and publicizing specific measures of the critical objectives of intelligence reform. It should apply these measures to the
  2. situation shortly before any legislation is adopted, and then again after periods of three and five years, reporting any changes to the President, the Congress, and the public.
  3. The legislation should also provide for prompt public hearings on the results of these reviews, and the conclusions reached by the Commission should be taken into account during the budget processes of both the executive and legislative branches.

This report was written by Jenny Ellis,  
Program Officer at the Project on Justice in Times of Transition.